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If our political rhetoric made any sense, “retreat” would be a four-
letter word. As an option, it often seems like it ought not to be 
mentioned in polite company. But the hurricanes and wildfires of 
 
* Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Penn State University. My 
thanks to the editors of the Journal of Environmental Law & Litigation for organizing the 
symposium, American Fire: Trends in Wildfire Law, Science, and Policy on Public and 
Private Lands, and inviting me to join. 
COLBURN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2018  1:18 PM 
4 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 33, 3 
 
2017 have again punctuated disturbing trends. At the intersection of 
lengthening and intensifying fire and hurricane seasons, depleted 
public budgets, exhausted response personnel, and continually 
growing human communities at risk lay a long, deep trail of mistakes 
and missed opportunities. This essay focuses on the fires and a federal 
statute that can help us correct some of our worst tendencies, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). But several of the points 
are regrettably applicable to hurricane risks as well.1 It is apparently 
our destiny today to confront an ailing political system at the same 
time that the full import of truly global problems like climate 
disruption are coming into focus. The suggestions offered here are 
painfully modest in comparison to what is needed. But that may be 
part of NEPA’s inner logic. It is by nature passive and incremental. 
Decades ago, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
Department of Interior, and state and tribal officials began building 
massive budgets and interagency capacities to fight wildland fires. 
Coincident with that build-up was our seemingly inexorable 
colonization of the wildland urban interface (WUI)—much of it in 
fire-prone areas.2 Part I of this essay explains how this confluence has 
worked to create more of the very risks both build-ups purportedly 
aim to minimize. Part II describes the push for fire-adapted 
communities through homeowner-taken precautions like defensible 
space, low-ignition building materials, and other means. The U.S. 
Forest Service has been actively engaged in this push to fire-adapt 
WUI housing, a pursuit Part II argues has reinforced the mistaken 
impressions leading even more people to build in harm’s way. 
 
1 In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma made landfall along the Gulf Coast 
causing a record $180+ billion in damage. Private insurance markets, although distorted 
greatly by a national flood insurance subsidy program, are arguably adapting to the new 
norms of hurricane volume/intensity. See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. 
MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A 
NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES (2009). No similar response from insurance markets, with 
the possible exception of Southern California, has been forthcoming in the new normal of 
wildfire protection. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
2 Mapping the WUI is complicated by the discretionary judgments entailed in the 
drawing of such boundaries/geographic regions. Compare Volker C. Radeloff et al., The 
Wildland-Urban Interface in the United States, 15(3) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 799 
(2005) (concluding that WUI in 2000 consisted of approximately 719,000 km2 and 
approximately 45 million homes), with David M. Theobald & William H. Romme, 
Expansion of the US Wildland-Urban Interface, 83 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 340 (2007) 
(concluding that WUI in 2000 consisted of approximately 466,000 km2 and approximately 
12.5 million homes). 
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Finally, in Part III the essay delves into the increasingly complicated 
law of alternatives formation, selection, and consideration in the 
National Environmental Policy Act. NEPA is our “national charter” 
on the environment.3 In many ways, it leaves us to our mistakes, 
unencumbered by any prohibitive agenda to block the kind of hazards 
routinely raised in WUI fire policies. NEPA’s role is to intervene in 
our political system, its aim to structure a deliberative process that 
can, on occasion, reveal our mistakes broadly before we repeat them. 
NEPA requires that we develop and consider alternatives to federal 
actions that may “significantly affect[] the quality of the human 
environment.”4 For as long as we have interpreted this duty though, 
only “reasonable” alternatives need be included.5 The mix of 
considerations that go into defining “reason” in this context is critical 
and in flux. And given the trends in wildfire policy explained in Parts 
I and II, the proposal and development of NEPA alternatives may be 
fast becoming one of the most useful tools for those aiming to redirect 
that policy. 
Which alternatives are “reasonable” and thus demand inclusion and 
development does not entirely lie with the beholder. Rather, it is a 
matter of timing and perspective. What I will call “retreat” 
alternatives can be both small and large-scale. They must be 
alternatives properly scaled and sensitized to the agency’s statutory 
limits, budget constraint(s), and policy goals. Though usually pressed 
by a dissident few urging a departure from some otherwise not-to-be-
questioned conventional wisdom (on wildland fire)—itself grounded 
in decades of (flawed) human practice—these retreat alternatives will 
typically proceed from the purpose and need for any given action or 
choice.6 
 
3 No matter how many times courts glibly remark that NEPA is “essentially 
procedural,” see, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), it cannot change the fact that the elements of the Act 
establishing a “national policy” are decidedly more than mere procedure. Their judicial 
enforcement may be qualified for a variety of reasons, but that is something very different. 
See Jamison E. Colburn, Administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 45 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10287 (2015). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018). 
5 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
6 This point of origin for alternatives is set out in the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) rules on environmental impact statements (EISs). See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2018). 
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I 
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY: A “10 A.M.” POLICY BY ANOTHER 
NAME? 
For much of the twentieth century, the Forest Service and 
Department of Interior land managers implemented what was known 
as the “10 A.M.” policy: attacking any discovered wildfire on the 
lands they administer with the goal of extinguishing it by mid-
morning the next day.7 This policy prompted decades of fire 
suppression which—combined with landscape-scale grazing, 
extensive road-building and other policies—amassed fuels and shifted 
fire-adapted ecosystems far off of their natural, self-regulating 
regimes.8 The halting reversal of the 10 A.M. policy and the shift 
toward managing fire on the public lands was epitomized in 1988; a 
summer that saw more than a third of Yellowstone National Park burn 
as managers struggled to contain and, eventually, extinguish the 
fires.9 After weeks of nightly news coverage, the political backlash 
that engulfed the land managers became a lasting cautionary tale.10 
Another episode was the 1994 South Canyon Fire west of 
Glenwood Springs, Colorado. Fourteen firefighters, most of them 
from a Type 1 (“Hotshot”) crew, perished in an eerily similar prequel 
to the fire that famously killed nineteen out of twenty Granite 
Mountain Hotshots on Yarnell Hill in 2013.11 In both cases 
 
7 See STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND 
RURAL FIRE 275–87 (1982). This aggressive policy of extinguishing all wildland fire grew 
out of a “holocaust” of wildfires that burned across 3+ million acres from eastern 
Washington to western Montana in 1910. Id. at 247. “Chief Forester Henry Graves 
declared in 1913 that ‘the necessity of preventing losses from forest fires requires no 
discussion. It is the fundamental obligation of the Forest Service and takes precedence 
over all other duties and activities.” Id. at 260. 
8 See id. at 295–326. 
9 The National Park Service’s (NPS) official accounts of the fires of 1988 state that the 
fires were attacked to be extinguished, at least as of July 21. Unprecedented conditions of 
fuel build-up in a wet spring and desiccation in a hot, dry summer had led to conflicting 
expert opinions up to that point. See John D. Varley & Paul Schullery, Reality and 
Opportunity in the Yellowstone Fires of 1988, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE 
ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA’S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 105, 112 (Robert B. Keiter 
& Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991). 
10 See Varley & Schullery, supra note 9, at 115–19. 
11 The Yarnell Hill blaze has been memorialized in film and pop culture. See ONLY THE 
BRAVE (Columbia Pictures 2017); Sean Flynn, No Exit: The GQ Story that Inspired Only 
the Brave, GQ MAG., Sept. 27 2013, https://www.gq.com/story/granite-mountain-hotshots     
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firefighters were lured into fighting a fast-spreading fire in shifting 
winds and tight terrain without enough exits because of the threat it 
represented to a WUI community. Section A traces out the 
institutional and legal relationships of wildfire in the twenty-first 
century while Section B examines its principal normative tool—the 
plan. 
A. Fire’s Institutional and Normative Landscape: Flexible, 
Dynamic, Extra-Legal 
In the decades since Yellowstone and South Canyon, backcountry 
fires have increasingly become WUI fires, mixing contain/extinguish 
and evacuation policies with resource management choices in a long-
term effort to achieve some kind of fire normalcy. The result has been 
a hodge-podge of national policy priorities distributed throughout 
federal, state, and tribal agencies, ad-hoc appropriations solutions 
(with annual budget shortfalls and stop-gap appropriations), and 
various interagency partnerships aimed at tidying up all of the 
above.12 A 2009 statute supposedly transitioned all of that to a 
mandated “national cohesive strategy” from the USDA, Interior 
Department, and other cooperating agencies.13 Since 2011, that 
mandated “strategy” has been comprised of three fundamental 
elements: (1) restoring and maintaining resilient landscapes; (2) 
creating fire-adapted communities; and (3) planning a united and safe 
wildfire response.14 The managing agencies elaborated each element 
into a series of “management options” and “implementation planning 
guidance” for operational personnel in a document known as the 
 
-firefighters-only-the-brave. But the South Canyon fire first drew popular attention in a 
novel by the son of Norman Maclean, Fire on the Mountain. See JOHN N. MACLEAN, FIRE 
ON THE MOUNTAIN: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SOUTH CANYON FIRE (1999). An assiduous 
post-mortem of the Yarnell Hill and South Canyon tragedies, others like it, and some of 
the many reasons why more such tragedies are likely is MICHAEL KODAS, MEGAFIRE: THE 
RACE TO EXTINGUISH A DEADLY EPIDEMIC OF FLAME (2017). 
12 See W. Wallace Covington & Diane Vosick, Restoring the Sustainability of 
Frequent-Fire Forests of the Rocky Mountain West, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 25–26 (2016) 
(noting that since 2000, when fire suppression costs first exceeded budgeted accounts, a 
variety of funding mechanisms and emergency appropriations have become the norm). 
13 The Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) Act of 
2009, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1738b (West 2018), required that the departments adopt a national 
cohesive strategy for fighting and managing wildfire on public lands. 
14 REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE FEDERAL LAND ASSISTANCE, MANAGEMENT AND 
ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2009 1 (2011), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy 
/documents/reports/2_ ReportToCongress03172011.pdf. 
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“National Action Plan.”15 A “vision” espoused in this national plan 
encapsulates the problem: “[t]o safely and effectively extinguish fire, 
when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our natural resources; 
and as a Nation, live with wildland fire.”16 
Until each of these priorities/elements, or the goals they commend, 
are resolved spatially and temporally, they remain at the discretion of 
operational personnel. This discretion is a principal problem of the 
National Action Plan approach. There remains some possibility that 
any operational choice—or its polar opposite—can be deemed a 
pursuit of the “national plan.” The keeper of this National Action Plan 
is known as the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC). The 
departments of Interior and Agriculture are trying to adapt themselves 
to the realities of wildfire as a knowledge problem.17 Notwithstanding 
the dearth of controlled, experimental evidence standing behind their 
claims, two researchers, Agee and Skinner, offered what has since 
become a kind of playbook of principles for fuels management.18 This 
is a vital playbook to the many Forest Service, Department of Interior, 
and tribal and state bureaus aiming to restore “healthy” fires to their 
lands. For it dispenses with the immense, all-consuming uncertainties 
about the good and bad—the cost effectiveness—of fuels treatment. 
From a series of ex post accounts of large wildland fires, accounts 
purporting to decide how and whether different fuels treatment tools 
(e.g., mechanical thinning, prescribed burns, selective cutting, etc.), 
did much to reduce the severity of the fires,19 Agee and Skinner’s 
“principles” emerged wholly unencumbered by the doubt, precision, 
or conditionality most peer-reviewed scientific findings must suffer. 
Some evidence suggests that areas which historically saw relatively 
frequent, low-severity surface fires can gain the most from restorative 
 
15 WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: AN 
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (2014), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/docu 
ments/strategy/NationalActionPlan_20140423.pdf. 
16 Id. at 3. 
17 The efforts to model wildfire’s spread have faltered on the vast number of 
variabilities in fuel conditions, the physics of convection, and pyrolysis. See Mark A. 
Finney et al., On the Need for a Theory of Wildland Fire Spread, 22 INT’L J. WILDLAND 
FIRE 25 (2013). 
18 See James K. Agee & Carl N. Skinner, Basic Principles of Forest Fuel Reduction 
Treatments, 211 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 83 (2005). 
19 See id. at 90–92. 
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work that returns that area to reference conditions.20 Beyond that very 
general notion, though, management priorities tend to recede into a 
soup of fragmentary and cryptic physical science clues, each with its 
own unique spatial and temporal scales and frames of reference. And 
while seasonal fire forecasts are also improving, stand-level variations 
in conditions that change with the weather, foliar moisture, etc., can 
alter the probabilities quickly and significantly.21 Knowledge 
synthesis and sharing, in other words, must precede priority 
definition, but priority definition is often the key to allocating scarce 
cognitive capacities needed for synthesis and distribution. 
Evidence-based conservation now confronts this paradox 
constantly.22 It can only be resolved by bending traditional 
institutional norms toward the “peer production” of the needed 
information and cognition. 
At its core, peer production is a model of social production, 
emerging alongside contract- and market-based, managerial-firm 
based and state-based production. These forms of production are 
typified by two core characteristics. The first is decentralization. 
Authority to act resides with individual agents faced with 
opportunities for action, rather than in the hands of a central 
organizer, like the manager of a firm or a bureaucrat. The second is 
that they use social cues and motivations, rather than prices or 
commands, to motivate and coordinate the action of participating 
agents.23 
These core characteristics describe the evolving norms and 
institutions in fire planning and perhaps even in conservation itself. 
Without a distributed design ethos animating the enterprise, however, 
jurisdictional overlaps become barriers instead of bridges, the 
constant need to rescale seems like a curse instead of a perceptual 
 
20 Paul F. Hessburg et al., Dry Forests and Wildland Fires of the Inland Northwest 
USA: Contrasting the Landscape Ecology of the Pre-Settlement and Modern Eras, 211 
FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 117, 131 (2005). What about those reference conditions 
protected forests from catastrophic fires has been the subject of intense debate and shifting 
opinion since Agee and Skinner wrote, though. See Paul F. Hessburg et al., Tamm Review: 
Management of Mixed-Severity Fire Regime Forests in Oregon, Washington, and 
Northern California, 366 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 221 (2016). 
21 See Mark A. Finney, The Challenge of Quantitative Risk Analysis for Wildland Fire, 
211 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 97 (2005). 
22 See Jamison E. Colburn, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 237 (2010). 
23 Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue, 
14 J. POL. PHIL. 394, 400 (2006). 
COLBURN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2018  1:18 PM 
10 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 33, 3 
 
necessity, and dynamic standards of performance seem deviant rather 
than de rigueur.24 
Rules, plans, and informal organizational cues affect human 
behavior at the “micromotivational” level, though, advantaging or 
disadvantaging this new form of production.25 And, unfortunately, the 
causal relationships are highly complex and poorly understood.26 At 
the very least, though, this ought to liberate us from our orthodox 
models of accountability. With peer production should come peer-to-
peer accountability: participants are just as apt to shirk responsibility 
in this new digitized and collaborative world as they were before.27 
Indeed, like the institution of peer review itself, peer-to-peer data 
sharing and peer production of fire planning syntheses will inevitably 
generate their share of strategic behaviors.28 
Another of the umbrella organizations, the National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group (NWCG), has long taken the lead in 
credentialing, training, and managing (loosely) our now immense 
wildland fire-industrial complex: the thousands of fire crews, aviation 
teams, and other frontline response personnel, supporting contractors, 
and civil infrastructure behind them. NWCG does not sign the checks, 
so to speak, but it does indirectly control who gets paid. NWCG and 
its programs determine in part how large fires shall be attacked with 
protocols and team preparation to meet the National Interagency Fire 
Center’s tiers of incident command and control.29 One of the chief, 
 
24 On the general outlines of this new normal, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, 
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
25 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 386 (2006). 
26 Much of what makes wildfires so deadly is the unpredictability of their spread 
dynamics. See Finney et al., supra note 17, at 25–26 (noting the divergence of standard 
spread theory equations from experimental and field results). 
27 See, e.g., JOSEPH MICHAEL REAGLE JR., GOOD FAITH COLLABORATION: THE 
CULTURE OF WIKIPEDIA (2010). 
28 See Bryn Nelson, Empty Archives, 461 NATURE 160, 163 (2009) (arguing that many 
scientists who are either personally or structurally set-up to publish research slowly will 
resist sharing data with others for fear of being poached, scooped, or deprived of the 
professional standing that should come from having collected the data); KODAS, supra 
note 11, at 301–09 (describing Forest Service personnel refusals to discuss Yarnell Hill 
events in after-incident communications because of the 2002 Cantwell-Hasting law 
requiring federal investigations and potential liability in wildfire fatalities). 
29 See BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, U.S. FOREST SERVICE & DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 2014 
QUADRENNIAL FIRE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 29–32 (May 2015), https://www.forestsand 
rangelands.gov/QFR/documents/2014QFRFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter QFR 2014]. The 
National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) groups incidents into tiers 1, 2, and 3: nationally,  
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and certainly most controversial, elements in NWCG programming is 
the dispatch of the aviation fleet and, in particular, the use of large air 
tanker (LAT) delivery of retardant.30 The age, value, and risks 
presented in the use of this fleet remains a polarizing subject.31 It is 
said that firefighters’ mortality risks double the minute they go 
airborne.32 One study of the 2010 and 2011 fire seasons found that 
“success” in LAT deployment is exceedingly rare, whether on 
“initial” or “extended” attack operations.33 Indeed, NWCG and others 
maintain that LAT usage for initial attacks in backcountry areas are 
the chief means of keeping fires from becoming Type 1 (national) 
incidents. But there is literally no evidence to support this 
conventional wisdom,34 despite some fifty years of study.35 And this 
failure has been brought to the USDA’s and the Interior Department’s 
attention repeatedly.36 To make matters worse, the vendors that 
supply much of the aerial delivery capacity have very potent 
incentives to favor the status quo and their cooperation in collecting 
such data would be indispensable.37 
 
regionally, and locally commanded. Tier 1 incidents will receive a Type 1 incident 
management team and other national resources as needed. Id. 
30 See Crystal S. Stonesifer et al., Fighting Fire in the Heat of the Day: An Analysis of 
Operational and Environmental Conditions of Use for Large Airtankers in United States 
Fire Suppression, 25 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 520 (2016). 
31 See KODAS, supra note 11, at 201–22. Many firefighters will report anecdotally that 
the “air show” or “CNN drop” of retardant from planes does no good and puts many 
personnel in very risky situations. See id. at 214–15. “If retardant weren’t red, it wouldn’t 
be used anymore . . . . There are no studies whatsoever that retardant use saves homes.” Id. 
at 215. 
32 Id. at 215. 
33 David E. Calkin et al., Large Airtanker Use and Outcomes in Suppressing Wildland 
Fires in the United States, 23 INT’L J. WILDLAND FIRE 259, 269 (2014). 
34 Cf. id. at 268 (finding a majority of deliveries are to “extended attack” operations, 
that initial attack deliveries are mostly ineffective, and that current resource ordering 
policies do not prioritize among requests for LAT involvement). The principal challenge 
Calkin and colleagues faced in attempting to assess the cost-effectiveness of LAT 
deployment is the lack of reliable data on retardant deliveries and containment results, see 
id. at 263–65, although what they were able to conclude from indirect connections 
suggested large majorities of deliveries in both years failed to contain fires, id. at 265. 
35 See Stonesifer et al., supra note 30, at 521. 
36 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-684, WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN INFORMATION, COLLABORATION, AND 
PLANNING TO ENHANCE FEDERAL FIRE AVIATION PROGRAM SUCCESS 1 (2013) (“[T]he 
studies and strategy documents did not incorporate information on the performance and 
effectiveness of firefighting aircraft, primarily because neither agency collected such 
data.”). 
37 The GAO remorselessly reviewed the approach taken since 1995. Id. at 13 
(“[A]gency efforts to identify their firefighting aircraft needs have not included  
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As many times as ecologists or historians insist that fire is a natural 
part of our landscape and will either burn at regular return intervals 
with the intensities that plant and animal communities have adapted to 
or will return violently, unpredictably, and with destructive force, 
land managers have continued to favor extinguishing wildland and 
rural fires. The arithmetic is simple. Especially in the West, where 
landscapes have shrunken one “wilderburb” at a time, backcountry 
fires that we once hoped could be allowed to burn become some level 
of threat to human communities or their watersheds almost inevitably. 
The intensity of today’s fires has ruled “let burn” policies out across 
much of the landscape. According to a study by Headwaters 
Economics in 2013, the cost of fighting fires tripled from the 1990s to 
today38 due in large part to the strategic involvement of so much 
WUI.39 Much of the fuels management spending has shifted there, as 
well.40 Even for the areas free of subdivision-driven development, 
land management decisions that jeopardize water supplies to drought-
stricken Western communities, by risking the damage that high-
intensity fires can inflict, have become a principal foil to fire regime 
restoration. 
Thus, the process of reintegrating wildland and rural fire with the 
landscape has been a fitful effort. Every fire season brings fire crews 
by the score to seemingly unprecedented fires—whether because of 
suppression costs, evacuation costs, or fatalities.41 In a recent book, 
our leading fire historian, Steve Pyne, described one such firefighter 
hero, Lynn Biddison, whose career in the Forest Service and time on 
 
information on the performance and effectiveness of using aircraft to suppress wildfires     
. . . . Specifically, the agencies have not established data collection mechanisms to track 
the specific tactical uses of firefighting aircraft—for example, where retardant or water is 
dropped in relation to a fire as well as the objective of a drop, such as protecting a 
structure or preventing a fire from moving in a specific direction—or measure their 
performance and effectiveness in those uses.”). 
38 ROSS GORTE, HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE 
PROTECTION 4–6 (2013), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/fire-costs  
-background-report.pdf. 
39 Id. at 7–11. 
40 See id. at 8–9. This tends to decrease the cost-effectiveness of fuels treatments. See 
id. at 9 (citation omitted) (“Treatments in the WUI are closer and more visible to humans 
and thus the public involvement process commonly takes longer and costs more. . . . Also, 
prescribed burning is, in many ways, the most effective means of reducing fuels, but the 
higher values and closer proximity of humans necessitate more personnel and more 
oversight to try to prevent the prescribed fires from becoming wildfires.”). 
41 See KODAS, supra note 11, at 310–16. 
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the line earned him a lot of peer respect.42 Biddison was fond of 
observing that “[t]he safest and least costly fires are the ones that 
receive strong initial attack and are suppressed while still small.”43 
And that is the strategic dynamic keeping us locked in an untenable 
status quo: fires are simply too costly when they really burn. So, our 
suppression teams race to put them out or to contain them—
functionally excluding fire from a fire-prone landscape again, just as 
the 10 A.M. policy did in the twentieth century—because our politics 
demand that we suppress what Pyne has called this “ecological 
insurgency” of fire. 
Finally, the roads of the National Forest System and other public 
lands allow tremendous access to backcountry areas. After the two 
largest fires in Arizona history,44 stakeholders comprising the Four 
Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI) settled some of their differences 
and agreed on a suite of strategic priorities for the four national 
forests of central Arizona.45 They agreed that one of the priorities was 
decommissioning many of the forests’ roads, especially in light of the 
threat human ignitions now pose.46 An exhaustive study of records 
from 1992 to 2012 by Balch and her colleagues found that about 84% 
of all wildfires and almost half of the total area burned stemmed from 
human ignitions, adding an average of 40,000 more wildfires per 
year.47 The seasonality of lightning strikes in many parts of the 
country means that human ignitions vastly expand the fire season.48 
Every mile of backcountry road decommissioned decreases access 
and shrinks the human ignition footprint. Part III considers this 
“retreat” alternative in context today. 
 
42 STEPHEN J. PYNE, BETWEEN TWO FIRES: A FIRE HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA 24–25 (2015). 
43 Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
44 The massive Rodeo-Chediski fire of 2002 burned 468,000 acres in east-central 
Arizona, only to be surpassed by the Wallow Fire of 2011 burning another 538,000 acres. 
Where the former was the result of an arsonist (looking for seasonal firefighting work), the 
latter stemmed from an escaped campfire. See KODAS, supra note 11, at 131, 171. 
45 See Annette Fredette, 4FRI and the NEPA Process, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 139 (2016). 
46 ANNA M. LUCAS, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE 
SOCIOECONOMIC MONITORING REPORT 14 (2013), http://www.4fri.org/pdfs/documents 
/collaboration/4FRI_SE_Monitoring_Report_7_26_13.pdf. 
47 See Jennifer Balch et al., Human-Started Wildfires Expand the Fire Niche Across the 
United States, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2946, 2946 (2017). 
48 See id. at 2947 (Table 1). 
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B. The Normativity of Plans and Planning 
A plan is, among other things, a mechanism for limiting discretion. 
It works to bind subsequent decisions. A plan adopted by a unitary 
agent is a kind of normative reason. It functions as a reason for action 
by serving as an intention-forming device and then guiding 
intentional actions over time.49 Unitary agents behave in 
instrumentally rational ways by forming and following plans. 
Internally plural agents, however, typically face greater challenges 
and most land use plans like those pertinent to wildfire are adopted by 
governmental agents necessarily operating across a variety of social, 
spatial, and temporal scales. They therefore serve important 
communicative or expressive functions as often as they serve to bind 
the future to pre-set courses of action.50 Local land use planners have 
often viewed their plans in this light51 and the synthetic national 
agents of wildfire planning seem to do so as well. This dual 
functionality of plans gives them a rich complexity. 
In their normative dimensions, however, land use plans in the 
United States have often fallen short of what they achieve as 
communication. Many states have long required their general purpose 
local governments to have a comprehensive plan guiding their 
development,52 even though the requirement that plans guide zoning 
 
49 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 8 
(1999). 
50 See, e.g., Cochran v. Planning Bd. of Summit, 210 A.2d 99, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1965) (“The master plan represents at a given time the best judgment of the planning 
agency as to the proper course of action to be followed. . . . A master plan is not a 
straitjacket delimiting the discretion of the legislative body, but only a guide for the city     
. . . which will show a commission from day to day the progress it has made.”). 
51 Charles Haar once argued that land use plans serve at least four main functions: (1) 
they serve notice on interested parties as to the probable outcomes for their development 
proposals; (2) they coordinate the variety of public actors within the jurisdiction adopting 
them; (3) as a regulatory framework through which permissions and prohibitions are 
oriented; (4) as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. Charles Haar, The Master Plan: 
An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 359–65 (1955). 
52 See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in Land Use 
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976). And many of these have long required that local 
land use decisions be consistent with such comprehensive plans. See JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, 
THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING (1980); Fasano v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973) (invalidating zoning change as inconsistent 
with county’s comprehensive plan). The extent to which plans actually guide local land 
use decision making, however, remains a hotly contested question, even within such 
jurisdictions. See id. at 16 (“Even in those states where legislation has been passed to  
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and other land use decision-making is—more often than not—
honored in the breach.53 In theory, plans’ expressive functions can 
make up for this shortcoming. They can announce a vision, signaling 
hopes and expectations for the future, if not necessarily hard 
commitments to act. 
As both norm and expression of future intentions, plans can 
resemble legal rules. Legal rules are obviously normative by nature.54 
But they play important, often subtle expressive roles, too. When the 
Wilderness Act of 1964 defined “wilderness” as “undeveloped 
Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without 
permanent improvements of human habitation,” it not only set out 
criteria by which federal lands should be judged for inclusion in its 
National Wilderness Preservation System;55 it also expressed a 
collective vision of how to treat such landscapes. But it is increasingly 
vital that we consistently differentiate the normative from the 
expressive dimensions of our natural resource laws and plans. The 
plans made by agents like the WFLC or Wildland Fire Coordinating 
Group (WFCG) serve as guiding—if not necessarily as governing—
norms, whereas proper legal rules, supposing they are established by 
an authoritative source, are the governing norms.56 When one decision 
from agents like the WFLC or WFCG purports to guide and to govern 
without clearly specifying which is which, our orthodox mechanisms 
of governmental accountability can fail. Part II reviews the specific 
geography of the trail of mistakes and failure: what we call the WUI. 
II 
THE RISE OF “DEFENSIBLE SPACE”: FIRE-ADAPTED 
COMMUNITIES AT RISK 
Whether the incident report in question comes from the Southern 
California fires in 2017, the South Canyon fire in 1994, or the Yarnell 
Hill fire in 2013, a continuing theme running throughout operational 
command decisions is the presence of human communities at risk and 
 
effect consistency, there is no generally accepted understanding of the term in affected 
local governments.”). 
53 See DIMENTO, supra note 52, at 1–9. 
54 Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 2 (1991) 
(contrasting descriptive laws like gravity from prescriptive laws like speed limits). 
55 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2018). 
56 The differences between these two are not as simple as they at first appear. See 
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). 
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the imperative need to halt an impending tragedy. This Part reviews 
the role of home ignition in our fire predicament. Section A traces 
several Forest Service programs and Section B looks at the private 
market. 
A. A New Smokey in the WUI 
Rocky Mountain Research Station scientist Jack Cohen has rivaled 
Smokey Bear in his influence on the promotion of “defensible space” 
around homes and the use of ignition-resistant building materials as 
means of reducing WUI fire risks.57 In paper after paper, Cohen has 
argued that proper engineering of the sub- and exurban homestead 
itself is the safest way to live with wildfire.58 By keeping vegetation 
away from the home, using firebrand-resistant roofing, covering 
intakes, and keeping flammable goods at a distance, Cohen argues 
that homeowners can defend themselves against a structural 
ignition/loss. “We cannot assume a direct causal linkage between 
extreme wildfires and WUI fire disasters,” Cohen wrote in 2008,59 
insisting that the disaster comes in leaving a home vulnerable to 
ignition. Imagine a local land use planning agent confronting a 
building permit application for a new subdivision up some 
hypothetical slot canyon drive. The applicant promises to implement 
Cohen’s fire wisdom (and to supply more taxpaying homes to a 
growing community). Will that planning agent budget the costs of 
protecting the subdivision from fire into the calculus? Will that 
planning agent even be able to calculate those costs? 
The federal agencies’ spending curves on wildfire suppression in 
recent decades are notoriously steep. Some of this is likely 
attributable to fuel conditions, i.e., pest infestations, shifts in 
 
57 Smokey Bear first appeared in 1944 urging Americans that it was their duty to 
prevent forest fires. See STEPHEN J. PYNE, AMERICA’S FIRES: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 42 (2010). 
58 See, e.g., David E. Calkin, Jack D. Cohen, Mark A. Finney & Matthew P. Thompson, 
How Risk Management Can Prevent Future Wildfire Disasters in the Wildland-Urban 
Interface, 111(2) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 746 (2014); Jack D. Cohen, The Wildland-
Urban Interface Fire Problem, FOREST HISTORY TODAY, Fall 2008, 20, 23–25 
[hereinafter Cohen, Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem]; Jack D. Cohen, Preventing 
Disaster: Home Ignitability in the Wildland-Urban Interface, 98(3) J. FORESTRY 15 
(2000); Jack D. Cohen & Jim Saveland, Structure Ignition Assessment Can Help Reduce 
Fire Damages in the W-UI, 57(4) FIRE MGMT. NOTES 19 (1997). 
59 Cohen, Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem, supra note 58, at 22. 
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precipitation, drought, heat, etc.60 Much of it stems from WUI 
development and the inherent complexity of “structural fires,” 
though.61 As more money is spent in the WUI, less is spent on 
wildland rehabilitation or management. 
More recently, Cohen and his colleagues argued that although 
wildfires may be inevitable, structural losses are not. 
How can land management agencies, first responders, and affected 
communities who face the inevitability of wildfires reduce the 
potential for loss? By doing what other institutions, both private and 
public, across sectors, have done in the face of complexity and 
uncertainty: turn to the principles of decision science and risk 
management.62 
Homeowner “engagement,” the risk managers argued, is the key—
the owner’s careful engineering of the “home ignition zone” is what 
determines their vulnerability to catastrophic loss.63 Admittedly, “[a]n 
appropriate application of wildfire risk management would 
incorporate the functional relationships between extreme-weather 
wildfires, landscape conditions, and home ignition/destruction,”64 but 
“WUI fire disasters cannot be prevented without homeowners actively 
creating and maintaining . . . low ignition potential.”65 The planning 
logic is clear: collectively, we must assume more WUI development 
and optimize from there.66 
While it is certainly true that a “home ignition zone” can sever any 
but-for causal chain last-ditch at the flame front, one of Cohen’s own 
collaborators is the foremost expert on the unpredictability of fire’s 
spread.67 Breaking down ignitions by probability or susceptibility one 
property at a time politely obscures the cumulative risk that results 
 
60 See GORTE, supra note 38, at 2–4. 
61 See id. at 7–9. One survey of Forest Service managers turned up estimates of 
between 50% and 95% of the agency’s firefighting costs going to protect private property. 
Id. at 7. 
62 Calkin et al., supra note 58, at 746. 
63 See id. at 748–49 (citations omitted) (“The likelihood of home ignition during 
extreme wildfire conditions is principally determined by . . . the home’s materials, design 
and maintenance in relation to its immediate (within 30 m[eters]) surroundings.”). 
64 Id. at 750. 
65 Id. 
66 Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 56, at 274–75 (“By settling matters in favor of the directed 
action, laws cut down on deliberation and bargaining costs and compensate for cognitive 
incapacities and informational asymmetries, thereby enabling community members to 
achieve goals and realize values that would otherwise be beyond their grasp.”). 
67 See Finney, supra note 21. Cohen himself was a co-author on one of Finney’s more 
recent papers. See Finney et al., supra note 17. 
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from some aggregate of choosers, each one of which weighs their 
own risks in isolation from the decisions of the others.68 Such work 
presumes that people can capably judge these 
probabilities/susceptibilities and reliably, diligently minimize them. 
Finally, it (impolitely) ignores the fact that first responders—who 
must put their lives in jeopardy in exigent circumstances—may be 
unable to judge enough of these home ignition zones (how to 
familiarize oneself with a property in ten seconds?) or what to do with 
such composited information for any of this to reduce their risks, 
either individually or collectively. Section B reviews the principal 
private initiative to these same ends. 
B. Firewise as Fire Wisdom? 
WUI fire planning has found its place in our fire-industrial 
complex. The Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) is now a 
federally-backed big business.69 Moreover, the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) is deep into its “Firewise” initiative, 
billed as “neighbors helping neighbors reduce risk collectively in a 
voluntary grassroots program.”70 This initiative, which sounds 
impressive anecdotally,71 is still in its relative infancy.72 NFPA offers 
a companion code, Standard 1141, on fire protection infrastructure in 
the WUI.73 Both are the work of a voluntary standards organization 
rooted in consensus approaches. 
 
68 It also underwrites the externalization of the risks borne collectively from 
individualized risk minimization. Once begun, policies of this kind can be very resistant to 
change. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at 262–65. 
69 Community Wildfire Protection Planning got its federal start in the Healthy Forests 
Restoration Act of 2003, 16 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6591 (2018). I described some of the progress 
in CWPPs in 2012. See Jamison E. Colburn, Declaring Disaster, 1 TEX. WES. J. REAL 
PROP. L. 1, 20–25 (2012). As of 2009, the National Association of State Foresters 
estimated that about 6,000 communities had prepared community wildfire protection 
plans. See ROCKY MTN. RESEARCH STATION, USDA FOREST SERV., RMRS-GTR-299, 
WILDFIRE, WILDLANDS, AND PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING AND PREPARING FOR WILDFIRE 
IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 24 (2013) [hereinafter WILDFIRE, WILDLANDS]. 
70 Faith Berry et al., FIREWISE: The Value of Voluntary Action and Standard 
Approaches to Reducing Wildfire Risk, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181, 196 (2016). 
71 Id. at 196–99. 
72 It remains to be seen whether NFPA can influence states to partner with the 
insurance industry, or to Firewise to increase fire insurance premiums significantly in step 
with the risk gradient(s). See GORTE, supra note 38, at 12. 
73 See Berry et al., supra note 70, at 200–02. Berry and colleagues rightly observe that 
codes like NFPA 1141 can “serve to level the playing field for developers and builders and 
provide a measure of equity and fairness with regard to requirements for new  
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Yet, we still have precious little reason to think that markets will 
(eventually) correct the tendency to build more WUI that worsens our 
collective position.74 Adding up the number of potential ignition 
hazards to be identified and diligently managed throughout an acre or 
more of “ignition zone,” multiplied by the number of WUI tracts—
many of which are secondary residences—instills little confidence 
that Cohen’s or the NFPA’s risk assessments are at all objective. And 
whatever the causal relationships at issue, that is what risk managers 
strive to achieve: objective probability distributions.75 Cohen and 
NFPA are surely to be commended for raising awareness of shared 
responsibilities.76 But the deeper, darker political waters of land 
development in America are no place to learn how to swim. 
Consumers’ optimism bias runs deep when they buy or build 
homes, and insurers have bigger profit sinks to fix.77 Further, federal 
subsidies to WUI disaster mitigation blunt market signals. The tools 
for addressing failures in the very political system to have entrenched 
these patterns reflect their value only in fully sobered assessments of 
the status quo. Part III considers the legal and political systems that 
have entrenched this new normal in fire planning and introduces three 
corrective uses of NEPA aimed at its gradual rehabilitation. 
III 
PRESSING AND DEVELOPING “RETREAT” ALTERNATIVES: THREE 
EXAMPLES 
Students of natural resources law in the United States are familiar 
with NEPA’s basic outlines. The original “impact assessment” 
mandate, NEPA aimed to improve federal administrative agencies’ 
 
construction.” Id. at 202. But distributive justice for developers is better left out of 
catastrophic risk management—where expert susceptibility assessments rooted in worst-
case assumptions are utterly indispensable. See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra 
note 1, at 355–56. 
74 See Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 445, 463–66 (2010). 
75 See Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
76 Cf. id. at 8 (“Risks only exist when there are decisions to be taken . . . . The idea of 
responsibility also presumes decisions. What brings into play the notion of responsibility is 
that someone takes a decision having discernable consequences.”). 
77 See KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 1, at 121, 258–59; cf. PYNE, supra 
note 57, at 67 (“While spectacular, damage from fire is less than that from water (one 
Category 4 hurricane is worth a century of wildfire). In terms of real economic losses, 
perhaps 85 percent of the wildfire damage is localized in California.”). 
COLBURN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2018  1:18 PM 
20 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 33, 3 
 
work by mandating processes of mutual criticism and analysis.78 It 
has grown rather complex in its implementation-by-litigation, and for 
having no single, authoritative administrator.79 In a nutshell, federal 
agencies must assess their “major” actions for potential environmental 
consequences and check them against the consequences of 
alternatives in consultation with cooperating agencies, interested 
states, and the public.80 The range of alternatives that agencies must 
consider, whether in a full environmental impact statement (EIS) or 
the more summary environmental assessment/finding of no 
significant impact (EA/FONSI), is always at issue. If NEPA’s role is 
to facilitate criticism by informed outsiders, alternatives should be 
sensitive to what participants have added.81 On the other hand, it often 
takes a court order to force an unwilling agency to respond to the 
counsel of outsiders.82 This, then, becomes a matter of the judiciary’s 
proper institutional role, especially in the case of alternatives that 
challenge an agency’s conventional wisdom or would change its 
priorities.83 The courts’ “rule of reason” has tended to proxy for a 
variety of considerations, some legitimate and some less so.84 
With a multifaceted, inter-generational problem like wildfire, 
however, leaving potentially transformative alternatives out of the 
“reasonable” alternatives to be studied in the reviews, plans, 
programs, and strategy documents that the USDA and the Interior 
Department now adopt routinely is a mistake. Sensitivity to the 
separation of powers has never necessarily blinded courts to agencies’ 
systemic biases, certainly not where advocates have brought forward 
 
78 See SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984). 
79 See Colburn, supra note 3, at 10288. 
80 See Nicholas C. Yost, The Background and History of NEPA, in THE NEPA 
LITIGATION GUIDE 1 (Albert M. Ferlo et al. eds., 2012). 
81 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 80–90. 
82 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 553 (1978); Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 
227–28 (1980). 
83 This relationship is, of course, framed by the applicable statutes and other authority 
binding the court and agency. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
376 F.3d 853, 870–72 (9th Cir. 2004); Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 
1094, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002). 
84 See, e.g., J. Matthew Hawes, Analysis Paralysis: Rethinking the Court’s Role in 
Evaluating EIS Reasonable Alternatives, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 537. 
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ample evidence to that effect through NEPA participation.85 Retreat 
alternatives will be identifiable more in how they intersect the federal 
agency and the choices afoot than anything else. They will be 
controversial by nature. Nonetheless, if, as the Ninth Circuit 
maintains, the “touchstone” of the inquiry into which alternatives 
must be raised and considered in any NEPA process is whether the 
“selection and discussion of alternatives fosters informed decision-
making and informed public participation,”86 retreat alternatives like 
those explored below may be uniquely valuable aspects of the NEPA 
documents attending our wildland fire decisions this century. 
Because of how the land managing agencies structure their NEPA 
compliance routines, forcing these kinds of alternatives into a 
decisional process can be a challenge for interested participants in 
agency administration.87 For example, in any EIS, the agency must 
“[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable 
alternatives,” “[i]nclude reasonable alternatives not within the 
jurisdiction of the lead agency,” and “[i]dentify the agency’s preferred 
alternative.”88 Within the Ninth Circuit, these requirements are 
enhanced by the notion of “viable” alternatives and their mandatory 
inclusion.89 That court has repeatedly held that “[t]he ‘existence of a 
viable but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact 
statement inadequate.’”90 But agencies, in the Ninth Circuit and most 
others, are “entitled to identify some parameters and criteria . . . for 
generating alternatives to which [they will] devote serious 
 
85 See, e.g., Robert E. Jordan, III, Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an 
Accommodation, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 745 (1973). 
86 See Headwaters, Inc. v. BLM, 914 F.2d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
87 The Forest Service, for example, announced in 2013 that it was revoking decades-old 
agency policy directing Forest Service offices and units to comply with the standards for 
rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act (which exempts rulemakings involving 
“public property”). Revocation of Statement of Policy on Public Participation in 
Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013). 
88 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(a), (c), (e) (2017). The agency’s preferred alternative should be 
identified in the draft EIS in order to solicit public comment thereon. Id. § 1502.14(e). 
89 Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass’n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 729 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
90 Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Resources, Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Idaho Conserv. 
League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992))). The D.C. Circuit recently took 
a step in this direction as well. See Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 
575–77 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The First Circuit did so in Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t Agric., 102 F.3d 
1273, 1286–87 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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consideration. Without such criteria, an agency could generate 
countless alternatives.”91 And this is the key for EIS alternatives: the 
“purpose and need” behind the action for which the EIS is being 
prepared92 dictates the legitimate scope of what must be considered an 
“alternative” within the meaning of § 102(2)(C)(iii).93 This 
“feasibility” of an alternative and the necessity of its inclusion in the 
agency’s deliberations will turn on the statutes governing that 
agency/action, the agency’s stated objectives, and the balance of 
advantages and disadvantages of that alternative revealed in the 
record.94 
Finally, the case law and the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) rules require that every EIS raise and consider a meaningful 
“no-action” alternative.95 Valid no-action alternatives must be 
constructed and analyzed from a true, i.e., realistic, baseline; and not 
some fictional baseline the agency might prefer.96 But the statute only 
reaches effects that can be linked to an agency’s discretionary choices 
through a “reasonably close causal relationship,” which the Supreme 
Court has likened to the “familiar doctrine of proximate cause from 
 
91 Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 575 (quoting Idaho Conserv. League, 956 F.2d at 1522). 
92 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13 (2018) (EIS “shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and 
need to which the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the 
proposed action”). It is not uncommon for an entire case to turn on the reasonableness of a 
purpose and need statement. See, e.g., Friends of the Se.’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 
1059, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 1998). 
93 Because the agency’s duty to develop alternatives pursuant to NEPA § 102(2)(E) is 
predicated not upon the proposal of some discrete “action” but rather on some “unresolved 
conflict” over alternative uses of “available resources,” alternatives developed pursuant to 
this provision need not necessarily follow from some stated purpose/need. See Jamison E. 
Colburn, A Climate Constrained NEPA, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091, 1110–21. The 
“purpose and need” cases are legion. Leading precedents holding that the required purpose 
and need statement cannot be “unreasonably narrow” include: Native Ecosystems Council 
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1246–47 (9th Cir. 2005); Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 
1104, 1118–20 (10th Cir. 2002); Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 120 F.3d 
664, 668–69 (7th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401, 1404 (9th 
Cir. 1996); City of Grapevine, Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); Idaho Conserv. League, 956 F.2d at 1520. 
94 See Union Neighbors, 831 F.3d at 574–77; Nat’l Parks & Conserv. Ass’n v. BLM, 
606 F.3d 1058, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2010); Davis, 302 F.3d at 1120–22 (10th Cir. 2002); 
Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1286–89. 
95 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d); see also Native Ecosystems Council, 428 F.3d at 1245–
49. 
96 See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
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tort law.”97 That keeps the evaluation of all alternatives to a fairly 
tight cause-to-effect circumference, at least until the agency chooses 
to broaden the inquiry. Section A considers retreat alternatives in 
aviation, Section B outlines the alternative of road decommissioning, 
and Section C explores a much larger, longer “retreat”: a retreat from 
the multi-facet optimization paradigm itself. 
A. Large Air Tankers: Deadly, Costly, and Ineffective? 
A familiar canard from the Supreme Court’s Vermont Yankee 
opinion is that “[c]ommon sense teaches us that [a] ‘detailed 
statement of alternatives’ cannot be found wanting simply because the 
agency failed to include every alternative and thought conceivable by 
the mind of man.”98 But common sense teaches virtually nothing 
about NEPA’s alternatives. Although it is fairly uncontroversial that 
agencies need not weigh every alternative raised in public 
comments,99 even the Vermont Yankee Court signaled that an 
alternative raised and developed by a NEPA-process participant can 
shift the burdens to the agency.100 Since Vermont Yankee, agencies 
that refuse to explore gift-wrapped alternatives—an alternative that 
some interested party has investigated and presented for their 
deliberations, which at least appear to accomplish the agency’s stated 
objectives without collateral costs or disadvantages—are often tripped 
up for having conducted their NEPA process arbitrarily.101 
The deployment of LATs in actual fire incidents will not elicit a 
NEPA document. It is in the planning for LAT deployment that a 
“retreat” alternative could, and perhaps should, be urged.102 Several 
indicators suggest that LATs are overused and ineffective. The 
 
97 U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004). 
98 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
551 (1978). 
99 See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, 8 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C. 2014). 
100 See Vermont Yankee, 541 U.S. at 553–54; see also Park Cty. Res. Council, Inc. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987); Druid Hills Civic Ass’n v. Fed. 
Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 713 (11th Cir. 1985). 
101 See, e.g., Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 831, 576–77 (D.C. Cir. 
2016); New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565 F.3d 683, 707 (10th Cir. 2009); Save 
Our Cumberland Mountains v. Kempthorne, 453 F.3d 334, 343–49 (6th Cir. 2006); 
California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 758, 770–71 (9th Cir. 1982). 
102 The Forest Service’s refusal to prepare an environmental assessment of the use of 
the retardant in LAT deployments was challenged and the decision remanded by Judge 
Molloy in Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1241 
(D. Mont. 2005). 
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feasibility or “viability” of a no-use or reduced-use policy or plan for 
LATs could look to a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) audit of the Forest Service and Interior Department and the 
costly exclusive-use contracts their vendors have enjoyed.103 An 
appalling lack of accountability in the funding of this capacity led 
GAO to conclude that, despite nine major studies since 1995, the 
agencies have failed to find any data supporting the effectiveness of 
LAT or other aircraft involvement in fighting fires.104 The National 
Interagency Aviation Committee seems to bear much of the blame for 
a general lack of collaboration, information gathering or sharing, and 
overall transparency.105 As these agencies cycle out of their legacy 
contracts in 2018 and beyond, changing their asset portfolios, they 
should have to justify the heavy reliance on aviation in firefighting 
wherever the opportunity arises. This may or may not involve a 
discrete “action;” if it attends a “plan” or strategic announcement, a 
more “programmatic” assessment of alternatives under NEPA § 
102(2)(E) may be the better venue in which to press this claim.106 But 
because doctrines in the Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits generally 
allow agencies to eliminate alternatives from consideration if they 
lack any basis in fact,107 developing the factual record is a necessity. 
Successfully urging and developing a “retreat” alternative like 
scaling back or even eliminating LAT usage will also turn on that 
alternative’s being part of a “reasoned choice” the agency cannot 
rightly avoid.108 Courts will only be likely to intervene where the 
exclusion of the alternative from detailed consideration is in some 
sense arbitrary or contrary to law. Yet this can be demonstrated more 
often than it presently seems to be: cases in the lower federal courts 
 
103 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 36, at 9–10. 
104 Id. at 11–17. 
105 Id. at 19–20. 
106 See Colburn, Climate Constrained NEPA, supra note 93, at 1112–21. Courts have 
routinely held that this provision constitutes a separate, independent duty under NEPA. 
See, e.g., Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1228–30 (9th Cir. 1988); Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Appalachian Reg’l Comm’n, 677 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aertsen v. 
Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1980). 
107 See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 295–300 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 1986). 
108 See Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 575–76 (D.C. Cir. 2016); 
Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1120–22 (10th Cir. 2002); Morongo Band of Mission 
Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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have made that clear.109 That, in turn, supplies countervailing power 
over a reluctant agency. Of course, some deference to the agency’s 
statement of purposes and need—which often confines the range of 
feasible alternatives quite tightly—will be unavoidable.110 But for a 
policy choice with such enormous collateral risk and expense, LAT 
attacks on fire seem well-suited to the proposal and elaboration of a 
planned retreat.111 
B. Road Decommissioning as an Ignition Management Policy 
The land management agencies all face statutory duties to plan 
their land uses. And for the multiple use agencies (Forest Service and 
Bureau of Land Management), the “travel management” elements 
therein can be the most challenging.112 As human ignitions 
(intentional and accidental alike) become a core focus of wildland and 
rural fire policies,113 the backcountry road networks sustaining so 
much access have become a fire policy focus. A “retreat” alternative 
in land and resource management planning is road decommissioning 
and, specifically, the elimination of access as a means of balancing 
agency budgets. 
In the 4FRI initiative, road decommissioning became a part of the 
four national forests’ land and resource management planning. Many 
of these roads were unauthorized and/or unneeded. The EIS for 4FRI 
phase I’s restoration agenda described a range of conditions—noxious 
invasive species, overcrowding, lack of age class diversity, etc.—for 
rehabilitation as well as a target of 700+ miles of unauthorized and/or 
 
109 See, e.g., Union Neighbors, 831 F.3d at 576; New Mex. ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 
565 F.3d 683, 711 (10th Cir. 2009); Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1287–
89 (1st Cir. 1996); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982). It has even 
proven possible to make out such a case in challenges to the range of alternatives 
considered in an EA/FONSI. See, e.g., Soda Mountain Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 
F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1263–65 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
110 See, e.g., Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 812–13 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174–76 (10th Cir. 1999); 
Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
111 This will be doubly so if, in procuring aviation assets, the vendor’s purposes or 
preferences are weighed too heavily. See, e.g., National Parks & Conserv. Ass’n v. BLM, 
606 F.3d 1058, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2010); Dombeck, 185 F.3d at 1174–77; Simmons v. U.S. 
Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 120 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1997). 
112 See DAVID G. HAVLICK, NO PLACE DISTANT: ROADS AND MOTORIZED 
RECREATION ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC LANDS (2002). 
113 See QFR 2014, supra note 29, at 6. Human ignitions outnumbered lightning strikes 
(usually by a wide margin) in all regions but one—the Great Basin—in a Forest Service 
study of ignitions from 2001–11. See WILDFIRE, WILDLANDS, supra note 69, at 15. 
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unwanted backcountry roads to be eliminated.114 The 4FRI initiative 
collects a massive, landscape-scale collaborative spanning the 
Mogollon plateau from the south rim of the Grand Canyon to the 
White Mountains in southeast Arizona.115 It involves a wealth of 
stakeholders and a long list of compromises being implemented over 
a decade or more.116 Other regions would be well-served to consider 
this example of collaborative governance in pursuit of multiple 
ends—rooted in retreat. 
C. Growth-Oriented Governance: Burning Money to Save It? 
Roads are a carnival of unintended consequences. The indirect 
consequences of road-building are legion and familiar. By contrast, 
the cumulative effect of fire suppression, fuels treatment, silviculture 
and other extractive uses, and our late, litigation-given management 
stasis rarely feature in public land governance: rather, they remain the 
stuff of historians’ quiet ruminations.117 The latest “Quadrennial Fire 
Review,” like its predecessors in 2009 and 2005, obliquely linked 
total forest control to firefighting and fuels management118 in its 
“enterprise-level review.”119 But as long-range risk assessments, the 
quadrennial fire reviews have been strikingly indifferent to the 
broadest trends. Today’s deficits of what foresters call “active 
management” grow out of the diversity of ways in which we value 
our forests: watershed protection, biodiversity and habitat, clean air, 
recreation, fuels and fiber, carbon storage, etc. By expecting so much 
and that “scientific management” should deliver it all from lands 
 
114 U.S. FOREST SERV., 4FRI FINAL ENV’T IMPACT STATEMENT, (2015), https://www 
.fs.usda.gov/detail/4fri/planning/?cid=stelprdb5361003 (last visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Cf. PYNE, supra note 57, at 88–89 (comparing the last century of fire policy to a 
failed experiment and suggesting that the actual “big burn” of today is fossil fuel 
combustion). 
The real error ha[s] been to imagine fire as a one-time task and a precondition to 
true management, instead of the dominant force on the scene. The potential error 
today is again to define fire apart from everything else, to suggest that it can be 
isolated, managed, harnessed to budgets and fire-year plans, when all the evidence 
of a century’s intense encounter says otherwise—says that it is consuming the 
agency’s budget precisely because it cannot be segregated from land management. 
Id. at 89. 
118 See QFR 2014, supra note 29, at iii. 
119 Id. at 1. 
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scored by intermixed ownerships, surprisingly durable private 
claims,120 and entrenched institutional boundaries; we have pursued 
optimizations that may be practically impossible.121 The one 
alternative ruled out for certain is what might be called the “stand-
aside” or prescribed natural fire option.122 
The agencies boast their consistent achievements of 95% 
(Department of Interior) and 98% (Forest Service) initial attack 
success rates, even as the rolling ten-year averages burned now 
approach 10 million acres per year and may double or triple that by 
mid-century.123 As fatalities mount and annual structures lost steadily 
increase,124 calls for a return to “tribal forestry” are being heard.125 
Landscape-scale, intergenerational assessments of forest “health” or 
functionality are beginning to attract attention, if not yet the needed 
information or perspective.126 This could, of course, be characterized 
as a retreat from the “multiple use, sustained yield” paradigm given 
policy preeminence by the Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act of 
1960.127 NEPA has surely revealed that paradigm’s diminished 
 
120 See Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. 
L.J. 991 (2014). 
121 See generally Robert H. Nelson, Our Languishing Public Lands, 171 POL’Y REV. 45 
(2012). To wit, the statutes and system-wide regulations requiring public participation in 
governance empower each affinity-, user- and watchdog group to create multiple veto-
gates, fostering “an adversarial process by more or less promising that all parties can get 
what they want, instead of creating the conditions necessary to bring everyone to the table 
to share the responsibility of solving problems by working together.” Matthew McKinney, 
Whither Public Participation in Federal Land Management? Replicating the Homegrown 
Innovations in Share Problem Solving, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10015, 10017 (2018) 
(discussing PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL 
FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR II (1996)). 
122 See PYNE, supra note 57, at 59–60. 
123 See QFR 2014, supra note 29, at 21–26. 
124 See id. at 26. 
125 See Julia Petersen & Nate Walters, Anchor Forests Video Series, Part 1: Land and 
Place, EVERGREEN MAG. (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.evergreenmagazine.com/anchor      
-forests-video-series-part-1-land-and-place/. 
126 See, e.g., Kimberly Wells, Note, Can’t See the Trees for the Forest? The Ongoing 
Controversy Over Assessing the Site Specific Impacts of Comprehensive Forest 
Management Plans, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 553, 562–71 (2014). 
127 16 U.S.C. §§ 529–31 (2018); cf. Nelson, supra note 121, at 54 (“In 2010, forest fire 
related spending by the Forest Service was more than $2.1 billion, the great majority in the 
American West. The Forest Service had discovered a new purpose to sustain its personnel 
numbers and budget—protecting the West from the newly threatening consequences of its 
own historic forest fire and timber program mismanagement.”). Besides budget concerns, 
strong initial attack is often justified by aesthetic, watershed, habitat, and fuel/fiber 
concerns. See Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful What You Wish For: 
The Legacy of Smokey Bear, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T. 73 (2007). 
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practical worth in light of restrictive zoning like that of the 
Wilderness Act,128 the Endangered Species Act,129 and the Forest 
Service’s Roadless Rule.130 
Integrated management can only proceed from integrative thinking, 
though. And if the core idea of “feasible” alternatives is that they 
address the underlying problem motivating an agency while doing so 
(perhaps) without the environmental costs projected to attend its 
initial proposal,131 then NEPA alternatives rooted in a let 
burn/restoration goal would stem from a “cumulative impacts” 
analysis of a regional landscape.132 If land use planning in the WUI 
has become a “wicked problem,”133 then some of the thinking from 
that planning field may be usefully applied to wildfire and total 
(federal) forest control. To brutally over-simplify, it starts from the 
key premises that (1) there is no definitive formulation of a “wicked” 
problem; (2) that any such problem can be viewed as the symptom of 
another problem; and (3) that any “solution” will be no solution at all 
to some of the public.134 Most professional foresters will insist there is 
no such thing as total forest control. But this may have more to do 
with the scaling than with the depth of their perspectives. 
The statutes set for our federal public land systems say virtually 
nothing about the scale in which their goals are to be pursued. That 
 
128 See Michael C. Blumm & Lorena M. Wisehart, The Underappreciated Role of the 
National Environmental Policy Act in Wilderness Designation and Management, 44 
ENVTL. L. 323 (2014). 
129 See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 417, 436–52 (2005). 
130 See Monica Voicu, At a Dead End: The Need for Congressional Direction in the 
Roadless Area Management Debate, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487 (2010). 
131 See Laura Lindley & Kathleen C. Schroder, The Alternatives Analysis, in THE 
NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE 101, 104–06 (Albert M. Ferlo et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the 
life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir. 1972) and the Dubois v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1289–90 (1st Cir. 1996) cases). 
132 See Jamison E. Colburn, Addition by Subtraction: NEPA Routines as Means to 
More Systemic Ends, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 145, 151–52 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013). 
Courts have occasionally remanded EISs for their failure properly to assess cumulative 
impacts. See, e.g., Oregon Nat. Res. Council Fund v. Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 
2007); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005). 
133 See Stephen R. Miller, Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface: A 
Guide for Western Communities, 49 URB. LAW. 207, 215–21 (2017) (discussing the 
concept of “wicked problems” from Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in 
a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155 (1973)). 
134 See Rittel & Webber, supra note 133, at 160–68. 
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statutory ambiguity is the key. If not necessarily unit-by-unit, system-
by-system annual governance, should a truly restorative fire agenda 
be scaled bio-regionally? Continentally? Over the course of a century 
(with realistic milestones)? A “retreat” alternative here would arise 
from system-wide planning—not unlike how the change of 
approaches to maintaining plant and animal diversity arose in the 
Forest Service’s 2012 planning rule.135 If complex interdependencies 
across multiple scales evade unit-by-unit, system-by-system 
governance when long-run, landscape-scale forces like wildfire, 
climate change, sprawl, species invasions, drought, etc. are afoot, the 
only “viable” alternative is to re-scale.136 Achieving goals like plant 
and animal diversity or the restoration of fire regimes requires a total 
situational awareness, sometimes over a very long run. Increasingly, it 
requires aggregating capacities, perceptions, powers, and strategies 
and, from there, knowing how to parcel out scarce resources like 
cognition.137 This is the normative power of planning at broad, 
societal scales and by resort to datasets and other tools that enable 
comparable perspectives. 
As industrial forestry faltered economically in the United States, 
the profession began looking for new “patrons,” even as the skills and 
tactics remained rooted in “active management.”138 Today, it is the 
“sustainable growth” philosophy itself that is faltering as it reinforces 
the monocentric, bounded unit’s constitutive relationships instead of 
fostering the development of new, more adaptive relationships able to 
 
135 See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 68 Fed. Reg. 21,162, 
21,169 (Apr. 9, 2012) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2018)) (explaining that the Forest 
Service was repealing a regulatory requirement that each system unit provide for plant and 
animal diversity by maintaining viable populations because, in decades of experience with 
that requirement it became clear that it was a practical impossibility). 
136 Cf. Donovan & Brown, supra note 127, at 77 (“Flood and wildfire risks can be 
controlled in two basic ways: modify the event itself or reduce the values at risk. . . . 
Homeowners surrounded by federal forests receive not only the forest amenities but also 
publicly-subsidized fire protection.”); BENKLER, supra note 25, at 137–39 (challenging the 
dominant portrayal of consumers and workers as passive and arguing that a peer 
production economy involves individuals that are sometime consumers and sometime 
producers “creating an environment built less around control and more around facilitating 
action”). 
137 See Catrien Termeer & Art Dewulf, Scale-Sensitivity as a Governance Capability: 
Observing, Acting and Enabling, in SCALE-SENSITIVE GOVERNANCE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT 38, 47–51 (Frans Padt et al. eds., 2014). 
138 See R. Bruce Hull, Forestry’s Conundrum: High Value, Low Relevance, 109 J. 
FORESTRY 50, 52–54 (2011). 
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bridge the divides that have ossified forest governance in our era.139 
Before it was the WUI locking the federal and state governments into 
an assault on fire, timber and taxes did so,140 but the results have 
stayed the same. 
In City of Davis v. Coleman,141 the Ninth Circuit took a momentous 
step in the history of NEPA doctrine. Here, the court held that an 
agency must weigh the reasonably foreseeable growth-inducing 
consequences of its actions when preparing its NEPA assessments.142 
Davis can surely be reconciled with Public Citizen’s doctrine of 
proximate cause.143 A litany of contributing causes brought us to our 
present moment, surely, but none loom larger than the unit-scaled 
optimizations for forces as disparate as climate change, wildfire, 
species invasions, commodity markets, recreation trends, and 
aesthetics—all while the stewards aim to accommodate and, in some 
cases, facilitate growth in their unit and system. With divergent 
directives from local congressional delegations and the whole 
Congress, integrative perspectives have grown more challenging still. 
While not quite the pork barrel mess the Corps of Engineers found its 
way into by the early 1970s,144 the Forest Service and Interior 
Department bureaus have unwittingly backed themselves into 
promises they cannot keep if they continue governing as they have. A 
programmatic, cabinet-level NEPA assessment should entail a variety 
of re-scaling efforts, though, beginning with top-level management’s 
compartmentalization of fire into daily, seasonal, and annual 
manifestations. Restoring successionally diverse, resilient landscapes 
demands that we scale our understanding of fire not as some event or 
episodic force—but as a continuum of relationships shaped constantly 
 
139 Cf. Termeer & Dewulf, supra note 137, at 45–46 (noting that enabling scale-
sensitivity is less about maintaining clear divisions of responsibility than it is fostering 
some redundancies of capabilities in a polycentric system). 
140 See HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 173–95 (2d ed. 
2004). 
141 City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); see also 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.8(b) (2017) (including within the definition of “effects” “growth inducing effects and 
other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use”). 
142 City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 675–77; see Daniel Mandelker, Growth Induced Land 
Development Caused by Highway and Other Projects as an Indirect Effect Under NEPA, 
43 ENVTL. L. REP. 11068 (2013). 
143 See Mandelker, supra note 142, at 11070; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (defining 
“effects” to include “indirect effects” which may include “growth-inducing effects”). 
144 See JOHN A. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS 
LEGISLATION, 1947–1968 (1974). 
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by spatially and temporally heterogeneous influences.145 A proper 
range of alternatives in that NEPA analysis, “essential to making a 
‘reasoned choice,’”146 would include public scrutiny and criticism of 
having any system-wide, top-down directives to optimize for all the 
policy priorities the public land statutes command as opposed, for 
example, to the fostering of regional experimentation by collaborators 
empowered to select priorities and tactics in place and from 
experience. 
Whether any outside party or group could force such an alternative 
into cabinet-level deliberations is a separate question. In California v. 
Block, likely the high water mark for judicial interventions 
broadening the scope of “reasonableness” in alternative selection, the 
agency accused of shirking—the Forest Service then weighing its 
roadless and wilderness policies system-wide—refused to develop an 
alternative in its programmatic EIS that would have diminished the 
need to make once-and-for-all choices about areas being or not being 
“wilderness.”147 The court said that if an alternative were available 
that helped the agency avoid such a high-stakes, irreversible choice 
born of incomplete information, then it was incumbent upon the 
agency to develop that alternative.148 And that may be precedent 
enough to bind reluctant agencies into considering a “retreat” 
alternative like those suggested above. 
CONCLUSIONS 
An unspoken premise to this point has been that an ailing political 
system cannot be fixed from within by direct, uncomplicated means. 
NEPA’s tools are indirect by design. Whoever the NEPA 
participant—be it a tribe, environmental nonprofit, local community, 
first responders, or anyone else—if they are aiming to act on any of 
what has been explained here, they will be facing a great deal of 
momentum that has gathered against them. Federal land managers and 
wildfire governance officials have partnered with state foresters, state 
emergency responders, and local governments in their attack on a 
 
145 See Hessburg et al., supra note 20, 132–34. 
146 California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982). 
147 Id. at 766–67. 
148 See id. at 767–68 (holding that premises framing the range of alternatives cannot be 
held “uncritically” and that an agency apprised of the possibility that its premises are 
incorrect and may therefore be unduly restricting the options weighed is obliged to 
reconsider and not just “[enshroud] the issue from public scrutiny behind the claim of 
administrative expertise”). 
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“deadly epidemic.”149 It is a testament to how serious our predicament 
has become that serious work on shared responsibilities to minimize 
risks cannot even be taken at face value anymore. 
The most successful reform pressures in ailing political systems 
across time—external threats—are missing here. And it is surely 
wrong to deny that this is a homegrown epidemic. Retreat by re-
scaling the natural resource problem is firmly rooted in experience, 
both here and abroad.150 What remains to be seen is whether the 
planning and collaboration currently in progress can adapt to address 
the knowledge and accountability deficits we face.151 Data-driven 
approaches to fighting fires, protecting lives and property, and 
restoring fire regimes will require continued investment in 
information-sharing, sorting and synthesis. “Social production,” as 
Benkler and others took to calling it, is liberating precisely because it 
constitutes a reasonably thick connection with remote others, 
jumpstarting the “collaborative filtering and accreditation[] which 
allows individuals engaged in public discourse to be their own source 
of deciding whom to trust and whose words to question.”152 But just 
as the mass media and politics of our internet age have not (yet) 
turned out the way the optimists perhaps hoped, our wildfire 
dilemmas cannot be resolved by localized collaboration or filtration 
of falsehoods about wildfire alone. It will take bold leadership, 
independent courts, and tactically shrewd advocacy. NEPA’s past 
successes have grown from the strengths of our system. Synthesizing 
new successes from the disparate starts we have reviewed here is 
urgent work. NEPA can help us get down to business. 
 
 
149 See KODAS, supra note 11. 
150 See, e.g., Termeer & Dewulf, supra note 137, at 43–44 (describing a collection of 
Dutch “water boards” through a “room for the river” campaign designed to move 
development back from the water’s edge). 
151 See supra notes 55–75 and accompanying text. 
152 BENKLER, supra note 25, at 465. 
